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### Hash Functions and Block Ciphers

... Calling the mixing **function** 1 time isn't **secure**. ... Designing **block** ciphers is like that. Sufficient **security** is easy, it's just a question of performance, and of ...  
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### Bellare - CBC

The **security** of the cipher **block** chaining message authentication code. ... the following general lemma: that cipher **block** chaining a pseudorandom **function** gives a ...  
[www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/cbc.html](#) - 3k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### Luby-Rackoff backwards: Increasing security by making block ...

... invertibility of a **block** cipher can reduce the **security** of schemes ... is the non-invertible analog of a **block** cipher, that is, a pseudorandom **function** (PRF). ...  
[www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/p2f.html](#) - 3k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)  
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### Administration and Programming Guide

... Calling **Functions**: Calling Net.Data Built-in **Functions**; ... Logic: IF **Blocks**: Looping Constructs: WHILE **Blocks** ... for Handling Error Conditions; **Security**: Direct Call ...  
[www-306.ibm.com/software/data/net.data/docs/noframes/400/](#) - 12k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### Administration and Programming Guide for OS/400

<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=function+block+security>

... Calling Net.Data Built-in **Functions**; Generating Web ... Looping Constructs: **WHILE Blocks** ...  
Handling Error Conditions; **Security**; Direct Call Language Environment; Calling ...  
[www-306.ibm.com/software/data/net.data/docs/noframes/400/dtwa2m02.htm](http://www-306.ibm.com/software/data/net.data/docs/noframes/400/dtwa2m02.htm) - 13k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### **RSA Security - 2.1.6 What is a hash function?**

... into **blocks** whose length depends on the compression **function**, and "padded" (for **security** reasons) so the size of the message is a multiple of the **block** size. ...  
[www.rsasecurity.com/salabs/faq/2-1-6.html](http://www.rsasecurity.com/salabs/faq/2-1-6.html) - 15k - Nov 13, 2004 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### **C [Security]**

... cryptography The art and science of information **security**. ... data formats and perform their **function** in the ... algorithm (for example, the RC2 **block** cipher), their ...  
[msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/secgloss/security/c\\_gly.asp](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/secgloss/security/c_gly.asp) - 31k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### **The Hashing Function Lounge**

... A very nice and deep analysis of the **security** of several hash **function** constructions based on **block** ciphers can be found in BRS02. ...  
[planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/hflounge.html](http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/hflounge.html) - 23k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### **Block Ciphers (part 1)**

... with many **block** ciphers there are some keys that should ... Design for an Extended DES", in Computer **Security** in the ... a particular **function** is selected by bits 1,6; ...  
[williamstallings.com/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/blockA.html](http://williamstallings.com/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/blockA.html) - 26k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

### **Block Ciphers (part 2)**

... its overall **security** is currently unknown. ... a one-way hash **function** capable of reducing a message to 64 ... JL Massey, "A Proposal for a New **Block** Encryption Standard ...  
[williamstallings.com/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/blockB.html](http://williamstallings.com/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/blockB.html) - 37k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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Best 200 shownResult page: [1](#) [2](#) [3](#) [4](#) [5](#) [6](#) [7](#) [8](#) [9](#) [10](#) [next](#)Relevance scale ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐**1 A comment on the confinement problem**

Steven B. Lipner

November 1975 **Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems****principles**

Full text available: pdf(435.94 KB)

[Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, citings, index terms](#)

The confinement problem, as identified by Lampson, is the problem of assuring that a borrowed program does not steal for its author information that it processes for a borrower. An approach to proving that an operating system enforces confinement, by preventing borrowed programs from writing information in storage in violation of a formally stated security policy, is presented. The confinement problem presented by the possibility that a

borrowed program will modulate its resource usage to ...

**Keywords:** Confinement, Leakage of data, Proprietary program, Protection, Security

## 2 Secure networks: SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP

Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, Marvin Sirbu

August 2004 **Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications**

Full text available:  pdf(236.82 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

As our economy and critical infrastructure increasingly relies on the Internet, the insecurity of the underlying border gateway routing protocol (BGP) stands out as the Achilles heel. Recent misconfigurations and attacks have demonstrated the brittleness of BGP. Securing BGP has become a priority. In this paper, we focus on a viable deployment path to secure BGP. We analyze security requirements, and consider tradeoffs of mechanisms that achieve the requirements. In particular, we study how to se ...

**Keywords:** BGP, Border Gateway Protocol, Interdomain routing, routing, security

## 3 Advertising and Security for E-Commerce: A lightweight protocol for the generation and distribution of secure e-coupons

Carlo Blundo, Stelvio Cimato, Annalisa De Bonis

May 2002 **Proceedings of the eleventh international conference on World Wide Web**

Full text available:  pdf(189.77 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

A form of advertisement which is becoming very popular on the web is based on electronic coupon (e-coupon) distribution. E-coupons are the digital analogue of paper coupons which are used to provide customers with discounts or gift in order to incentive the purchase of

some products. Nowadays, the potential of digital coupons has not been fully exploited on the web. This is mostly due to the lack of "efficient" techniques to handle the generation and distribution of e-coupons. In this paper we d ...

**Keywords:** accountability, e-commerce, e-coupons, security

#### 4 Secure password-based cipher suite for TLS

May 2001 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 4

Issue 2

Full text available:  pdf(507.57 KB)

Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)

SSL is the de facto standard today for securing end-to-end transport on the Internet. While the protocol itself seems rather secure, there are a number of risks that lurk in its use, for example, in web banking. However, the adoption of password-based key-exchange protocols can overcome some of these problems. We propose the integration of such a protocol (DH-EKE) in the TLS protocol, the standardization of SSL by IETF. The resulting protocol provides secure mutual authentication and key establi ...


**Keywords:** Authenticated key exchange, dictionary attack, key agreement, password, perfect forward secrecy, secure channel, transport layer security, weak secret

#### 5 Cellular and Cryptographic Applications: Cryptographic rights management of FPGA intellectual property cores

Tom Kean

February 2002 **Proceedings of the 2002 ACM/STGDA tenth international symposium on**

**Field-programmable gate arrays**

Full text available:  pdf(171.79 KB)

Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)


As the capacity of FPGA's increases to millions of equivalent gates the use of Intellectual Property (IP) cores becomes increasingly important to control design complexity. FPGA's are becoming platforms for integrating a system solution from components supplied by independent vendors in the same way as printed circuit boards provided a platform for earlier generations of designers. However, the current commercial model for IP cores involves large up-front license fees reminiscent of ASIC NRE cha ...

**Keywords:** FPGA, cryptography, intellectual property, rights management

## 6 Analysis of packet networks having contention-based reservation with application to GPRS

John N. Daigle, Marcos Nascimento Magalhães

August 2003 **IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)**, Volume 11 Issue 4

Full text available:  pdf(801.23 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#), [review](#)


In this paper, we develop a model to quantify the performance of message transmission systems in which users must reserve transmission resources via a contention mechanism prior to transmission. Our work is motivated by a desire to understand the performance characteristics of systems such as the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), where the single forward link of the wireless access system is organized as a sequence of frames, each of which has first a contention period and then a service peri ...

**Keywords:** General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Markov renewal processes, cellular communications, communication networks, contention protocols, performance analysis, queueing systems, wireless communications

### A nested transaction model for multilevel secure database management systems

Elisa Bertino, Barbara Catania, Elena Ferrari

November 2001 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 4 Issue 4

Full text available:  [pdf\(560.96 KB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)


This article presents an approach to concurrency control for transactions in a Multilevel Secure Database Management System (MLS/DBMS). The major problem is that concurrency control mechanisms used in traditional DBMSs are not adequate in a MLS/DBMS, since they may be exploited to establish covert channels. The approach presented in this article, which uses single-version data items, is based on the use of nested transactions, application-level recovery, and notification-based locking protocols. ...

**Keywords:** Nested transactions, concurrency control, covert channels, multilevel secure database management systems

### 8 A decentralized model for information flow control

Andrew C. Myers, Barbara Liskov


October 1997 **ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review , Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles**, Volume 31 Issue 5

Full text available:  [pdf\(2.24 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

### 9 Securing ATM networks

Shaw-Cheng Chuang

January 1996 **Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security**

Full text available:  [pdf\(1.53 MB\)](#) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)




**10** Key management for encrypted broadcast

Avishai Wool

May 2000 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 3

Issue 2


Full text available:  pdf(220.36 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

We consider broadcast applications where the transmissions need to be encrypted, such as direct broadcast digital TV networks or Internet multicast. In these applications the number of encrypted TV programs may be very large, but the secure memory capacity at the set-top terminals (STT) is severely limited due to the need to withstand pirate attacks and hardware tampering. Despite this, we would like to allow the service provider to offer different packages of programs to the users. A user ...

**Keywords:** conditional access, pay-per-view

**11** A secure multicast protocol with copyright protection

Hao-hua Chu, Lintian Qiao, Klara Nahstedt, Hua Wang, Ritesh Jain

April 2002 **ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review**, Volume 32 Issue 2Full text available:  pdf(301.97 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

We present a simple, efficient, and secure multicast protocol with copyright protection in an open and insecure network environment. There is a wide variety of multimedia applications that can benefit from using our secure multicast protocol, e.g., the commercial pay-per-view video multicast, or highly secure military intelligence video conference. Our secure multicast protocol is designed to achieve the following goals. (1) It can run in any open network environment. It does not rely on any sec ...

**Keywords:** copyright protection, key distribution, multicast security, watermark

## **12 Data privacy: Private collaborative forecasting and benchmarking**

Mikhail Atallah, Marina Bykova, Jiangtao Li, Keith Frikken, Mercan Topkara

October 2004 **Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic**

**society**

Full text available:  pdf(217.50 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)


Suppose a number of hospitals in a geographic area want to learn how their own heart-surgery unit is doing compared with the others in terms of mortality rates, subsequent complications, or any other quality metric. Similarly, a number of small businesses might want to use their recent point-of-sales data to cooperatively forecast future demand and thus make more informed decisions about inventory, capacity, employment, etc. These are simple examples of cooperative benchmarking and (respectiv ...

**Keywords:** benchmarking, e-commerce, forecasting, privacy, secure multi-party computation, secure protocol

## **13 Some cryptographic principles of authentication in electronic funds transfer systems**

C. H. Meyer, S. M. Matyas

October 1981 **Proceedings of the seventh symposium on Data communications**

Full text available:  pdf(1.22 MB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)

One essential requirement of an Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) system is that institutions must be able to join together in a common EFT network such that a member of one institution can initiate transactions at entry points in the domain of another institution. The use of such a network is defined as interchange. Cryptographic implementations are

developed for such a network in such a way as to keep personal verification and message authentication processes at diffe ...

#### 14 **SOS: secure overlay services**

Angelos D. Keromytis, Vishal Misra, Dan Rubenstein  
 August 2002 **ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review , Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications**, Volume 32 Issue 4

Full text available:  pdf(210.90 KB)


Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supportin ...

**Keywords:** denial of service attacks, network security, overlay networks

#### 15 **Digital signets: self-enforcing protection of digital information (preliminary version)**

Cynthia Dwork, Jeffrey Lotspiech, Moni Naor  
 July 1996 **Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing**

Full text available:  pdf(1.24 MB)

Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

#### 16 **Software engineering for security: a roadmap**

<http://portal.acm.org/results.cfm?coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=31207416&CFTOKEN=85392902>

Premkumar T. Devanbu, Stuart Stubblebine

May 2000 **Proceedings of the Conference on The Future of Software Engineering**

Full text available:  pdf(1.71 MB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)



**Keywords:** copy protection, security, software engineering, water-marking


### **17** Cryptographic verification of test coverage claims

Prem Devanbu, Stuart G. Stubblebine

November 1997 **ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes , Proceedings of the 6th**

**European conference held jointly with the 5th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering,**

Volume 22 Issue 6


Full text available:  pdf(1.67 MB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)



### **18** Electronic commerce: a half-empty glass?

Sasa Dekleva

June 2000 **Communications of the AIS**

Full text available:  pdf(343.49 KB) Additional Information: [full citation](#), [references](#)



### **19** Rethinking the design of the Internet: the end-to-end arguments vs. the brave new world

Marjory S. Blumenthal, David D. Clark

August 2001




**ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)**, Volume 1 Issue 1Full text available:  [pdf \(176.33 KB\)](#)Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [citations](#), [index terms](#)

This article looks at the Internet and the changing set of requirements for the Internet as it becomes more commercial, more oriented toward the consumer, and used for a wider set of purposes. We discuss a set of principles that have guided the design of the Internet, called the end-to-end arguments, and we conclude that there is a risk that the range of new requirements now emerging could have the consequence of compromising the Internet's original design principles. Were ...

**Keywords:** ISP, Internet, end-to-end argument**20 A secure and private system for subscription-based remote services**

Pino Persiano, Ivan Visconti

November 2003 **ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)**, Volume 6 Issue 4Full text available:  [pdf \(241.65 KB\)](#)Additional Information: [full citation](#), [abstract](#), [references](#), [index terms](#)


In this paper we study privacy issues regarding the use of the SSL/TLS protocol and X.509 certificates. Our main attention is placed on subscription-based remote services (e.g., subscription to newspapers and databases) where the service manager charges a flat fee for a period of time independent of the actual number of times the service is requested. We start by pointing out that restricting the access to such services by using X.509 certificates and the SSL/TLS protocol, while preserving the in ...

**Keywords:** Access control, anonymity, cryptographic algorithms and protocols, privacy, world-wide web

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